REMARKS

ON THE

LETTER

ADDRESS'D TO

TWO GREAT MEN.

[PRICE ONE SHILLING.]

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TWO GREAT MEN.

In a LETTER to the

AUTHOR of that PIECE.

Vis consilî expers mole ruit sua:
Vim temperatam dî quoque provehunt
In majus: idem odere vires
Omne nefas animo movientes.

HOR.

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REMARKS, &c.

SIR,

I Shall not enquire who is the Author of the Piece on which I am going to remark. Your Opinions, and your Arguments are all that I ſhall conſider. Whether you are, or ever have been ‡ penſioned and employed, whether you are a private Man, or a Perſon diſtinguiſhed in Rank and Fortune, you are to me and to the Publick on this occaſion, only the Author of the Letter to Two Great Men; and you will give me leave to addreſs you in that and in no other Light. It is indeed a Light, in which you cannot be viewed to your diſadvantage; your Letter is animated with the Spirit of true Patriotiſm; it diſcovers political and hiſtorical Knowledge; and it is written throughout with Fire and Energy.

But, Sir, that animation of Language and Sentiment, which is allowed to the Orator in Political Conflicts *in Pulvere et in Sole*, has no place in a ſober Diſcuſſion. I write not to the Ear or to the Paſſions;

‡ Vid. p. 2. of the Letter.

I aim at no Seduction of Judgment; and I aſk for no approbation but what a calm Reflection and unprejudiced Reaſon may afford me. My End is, rather to examine the juſtneſs of your Plan, than to enforce any Plan of my own; and I ſhall not affect the Flow, nor the Pomp, nor the high colouring of Parliamentary Declamation. If I can deliver a plain Argument in plain Language, it is all I aim at: for what I am doing I ſhall make no Apology. That Freedom with which you warn the Miniſtry againſt falling into Miſtakes in the enſuing Treaty, will juſtify me to you, and to the World, if I ſhould attempt to point out ſome of thoſe Miſtakes, into which I imagine you are yourſelf fallen.

You cannot be ignorant in what manner Succeſs operates upon the Minds of Men; with what a blind and haughty Confidence it inſpires them; and in the inſolent Elation of Victory, how little they attend to Reaſon, or Juſtice, and often to their own moſt important Intereſts. People of all Nations imagine, that when they are worſted, Succeſs gives their Enemy very little Right to preſcribe ſevere Terms; and conceive when they

are themſelves ſucceſsful, that there are no Bounds to their own Pretenſions. If ſuch a Diſpoſition ſhould happen at this time to prevail amongſt us, it may be attended with very pernicious Conſequences. It may raiſe ſuch extravagant Expectations, or excite ſueh wrong-placed Deſires, as will render a Negotiation for Peace a Work of infinite Difficulty. A virtuous and able Miniſtry may in ſome ſort find their Virtue and Ability brought to act againſt themſelves; they may find that their Victories and Succeſſes have excited ſo much Arrogance in thoſe who had no Share in acquiring them, as to deſtroy all their Effects; they may find their Virtue and Moderation overruled by the Madneſs of the People, and be thus diſabled from availing themſelves of a ſucceſsful War, for the Attainment of an advantageous Peace.

I am afraid, Sir, that your Letter tends to increaſe and to inflame this Diſpoſition: you are not to be blamed for delivering your Sentiments openly; the Liberty of an Engliſhman, and your own Abilities, give you a right to do ſo. What I blame is your exceſſive Attachment to certain Objects; ſo exceſſive that if

they ſhould not be inſiſted upon by the Miniſtry, with a Warmth equal to your own, you heſitate not to declare to the People, * *that we ſhall have a treacherous and deluſive Peace.* This, Sir, is ſurely a moſt unjuſtifiable Method of proceeding; it is to ſow the Seeds of a general Diſcontent in favour of your particular Opinions; Opinions, which if they are not ill founded, are at leaſt very problematical: I cannot help obſerving, that your Reſentment againſt the Perfidy of the Enemy, has made you ſeem much more intent upon affronting *France*, than providing deliberately for the Intereſts of *Britain.*

You ſet forth with great Strength of Fact and Reaſon, the treachery of *France*, and her frequent Violations of the moſt ſolemn Treaties. You inſiſt particularly on the Caſe of *Dunkirk*: and I admit that you could not have choſen a more proper Inſtance. But I am ſorry to ſee that you are even here, guided more by old Prejudices than by the true Nature of Things; and that you have propoſed ſuch a *Manner* of acting, that whilſt we are in reality

* Vid. p. 29. of the Letter.

only

only demanding our honeſt and unqueſtionable Rights, we ſhall have all the Appearance of acting with the moſt wanton Inſolence, with the moſt hateful Oppreſſion.

You adviſe the Two Great Men, that, " ‖ *before they enter upon any new* " *Treaty, or liſten to any plauſible Propo-* " *ſal whatever, they ought to inſiſt that* " *Juſtice may be done with regard to for-* " *mer Treaties, ſhew* France *the ſolemn* " *Engagements ſhe entered into at* Utrecht " *to demoliſh* Dunkirk. " *Demand,*" ſay you, " *immediate Juſtice on that Article,* " *as a preliminary Proof of her Sincerity* " *in the enſuing Negotiation. Tell them* " *with the Firmneſs of wiſe Conquerors,* " *that the Demolition of* Dunkirk *is what* " *you are entitled to by Treaties made* " *long ago and violated, and that it ſhall* " *not be ſo much as mentioned in the en-* " *ſuing Negotiation, but complied with be-* " *fore that Negotiation ſhall commence.*"

This is a Sort of Language hitherto, I believe, unheard in *Europe*; but why you confine theſe extraordinary Demands to *Dunkirk* I cannot imagine. Why do you

‖ Vid. p. 24, 25.

not

not inſiſt that *France* ſhould in the ſame *previous* manner renounce all Right to the diſputed Parts of *America?* You will I hope allow, that the *French* Encroachments there, are as much againſt the Faith of Treaties, as the Reſtoration of *Dunkirk*; and that we have full as good a right to expect every Reparation of Intereſt and Honour with regard to the one, as to the other. But if all Points wherein the Violation of Treaties is charged, ought not, (according to your Doctrine,) to be ſo much as mentioned in the enſuing Negotiation, but ought to be ſettled before that Negotiation ſhall commence; the Buſineſs of the Congreſs will be ſo very ſhort, and ſo very eaſy, as to require no wonderful Share of that Knowledge, that Adroitneſs, and all that Combination of Talents, and Virtues, which you demand in a Plenipotentiary; but which you are almoſt in Deſpair of finding among our Nobility. An *Engliſh* Plenipotentiary, to ſpeak and to act to the Letter of the Inſtructions which you give him, need only aſſume a deciſive and dictatorial Tone; to rail abundantly at thoſe employed by the Enemy to treat with him; to remind *them of their amazing Perfidy*; * to tell them *that he owes them*

* P. 24.

them a Diſgrace †; to tell them *that he can have no Dealings with ſuch a People*; * and thus to go through the little that is left to be done with as great Airs of Arrogance and Superiority as he can poſſibly aſſume. Theſe are Accompliſhments indeed not difficult to be found, and which we need not deſpair to meet with at *Arthur's, or on the Turf.* ‡

I do not, Sir, mean to inſinuate, that the Demolition of *Dunkirk* is not an Object worthy of our regard. It is indeed probably not of quite ſo much Importance, as you think it, and as formerly it was thought, whilſt in the Continental Wars of King *William*, and Queen *Anne*, we neglected our Naval Strength, and the due Protection of our Trade. However, as it is ſtill an Object, there is no doubt but in the enſuing Negotiation our Miniſtry will attend with proper Care to have it demoliſhed, according to the Tenor of former Treaties. This, Sir, we may ſuppoſe with ſome Aſſurance, will be done. But that this be done before we condeſcend to treat, that it is to be a Preliminary to the Preliminaries of Peace, is an Idea altogether extravagant, and as little

† P. 25. * P. id.. ‡ P. 6.

juſtified

juſtified by Precedent as by Reaſon. That thoſe very Matters for which War was declared ſhould not be ſo much as mentioned in the Negotiation for Peace, is a Principle abſolutely your own, and to which all the Writers on Politicks have to this Day been entirely Strangers. You ſeem indeed aware of this, and therefore aſſert that ſuch Demands as you propoſe † "cannot be looked upon as the Inſo-" lence of a Conqueror, but as the wiſe " Foreſight of a People, whom dear-" bought Experience hath taught the " proper Way of doing itſelf Juſtice. For you obſerve ſome few Lines before, that we ought " § to take every Method in " our Power to *ſecure* the Obſervance of " thoſe Conceſſions they may make; and " to inſiſt upon their giving us ſuch *Proofs* " *of their Sincerity* before any Negotiation " is entered upon, as may give us ſome " *Aſſurance*, that they *mean to be more* " *faithful* to their *future Engagements*." The way then in which you propoſe we ſhould do ourſelves Juſtice, is to inſiſt that *Dunkirk* be demoliſhed before we liſten to any Propoſal of Peace, becauſe you imagine that a Compliance with this Demand by *France* will be a Proof of their

† Vid. p. 9. of the Letter. § Ibid.

Sincerity,

Sincerity, and a Security for their adhering to the Treaty.

I ſhould, Sir, moſt willingly concur with you, in recommending any Method which might ſecure their Adherence to ſuch Conceſſions as they ſhall make; which might draw from them any *real Proof of their Sincerity*, or which would give us *ſome Aſſurance that they mean to be more faithful to their future Engagements:* but I have conſidered your Demand in every Light which I was capable of putting it; and after all I am utterly unable to diſcover, if *France* ſhould ſubmit to the humiliating Step you propoſe, what additional Security this will, or can give us, that ſhe will adhere to her Engagements whenever ſhe ſhall find it her Intereſt to break them. This Step may indeed be a mortifying Confeſſion of her preſent Weakneſs, but can be no Security for her future Faith.

So far from having any ſuch Operation, there is all Reaſon to ſuppoſe that it would produce the contrary Effect. A Nation which through the Neceſſity of its Affairs, ſubmits to Terms impoſed for no other purpoſe than to inſult

inſult her, ſeeks the firſt Opportunity to wipe off the Stain. She will not look upon ſuch Engagements as a Treaty, but as an Oppreſſion; and ſhe will find a ſort of Excuſe for the Infidelity of her Conduct, in the Inſolence of ours. Nations, like Men, reſent an Inſult more than an Injury.

Unreaſonable as this Demand may be, you however ſeem fond of it; for you again aſk, "Can you have any "Dealings with a Power, who, if he "refuſes this, at the very Time that "he is treating, affords you a ma-"nifeſt Proof that his Word is not "to be relied upon, and that you can-"not truſt to the Execution of any "Promiſes ever ſo ſolemnly made?" Why not? You may, Sir, undoubtedly have Dealings with ſuch a Power, notwithſtanding ſuch a Refuſal; becauſe they only do what is extremely natural, and extremely reaſonable, in refuſing to deſtroy a Place which is of uſe to them in War, before their Enemy has condeſcended to treat for Peace. You

Vid. p. 25. of the Letter.

do

do not ſure imagine, that any Nation is ſo ignorant and ſottiſh as not to know, that the Weakening its Hands before a Negotiation for Peace, is not the way to ſecure it good Terms in that Negotiation; and that they may well refuſe to comply with this ignominious and unſafe Condition, without manifeſting any Intention of ſwerving from their future Engagements. If it could be ſuppoſed for a Moment that our Adminiſtration would adopt your Syſtem, might not *France* in her turn aſk, and very reaſonably too, What Security we propoſe to give, if ſhe ſhould ſubmit to this extraordinary previous Preliminary, that we ſhall even then conſent on our Side to an equitable Peace? Or that this firſt unreaſonable Demand may not be followed by others ſtill more unreaſonable, whilſt we have any thing to aſk, or ſhe any thing to give? To anſwer *Væ victis* would ſound ſtrangely; to anſwer otherwiſe with Conſiſtency is impoſſible; and it muſt be allowed, that ſo extraordinary a Demand previous to a Treaty, would be a very bad Omen of our Moderation in the Treaty itſelf. A Compliance with it would indeed

mor-

mortify the Enemy, but it would add nothing to our real Strength; whilſt it would alarm every Nation near us, and aſſiſt *France* in exciting that Jealouſy of the *Britiſh* Naval Power, which ſhe has for a long Time been labouring with great Induſtry, and ſome Succeſs, to infuſe into all the Nations of *Europe*, and particularly into the Maritime States. You have very well obſerved upon the Terror which was excited by the Power of *Lewis* XIV. and upon the general Confederacy againſt him, which was the Conſequence of this Power: but you have forgot to add, that the inſolent uſe he made of his Greatneſs, alarmed as much, and provoked much more, than that enormous Power itſelf: it was indeed the true Cauſe of his Fall. Other Nations alſo may be thought too powerful; and they will be thought ſo, whenever they exerciſe their Power with Haughtineſs. Without having recourſe to ‡ a *Monteſquieu*, perhaps, Sir, it may be found that the *Roman*, the *Spaniſh*, and

‡ P. 38. of the Letter. Perhaps it might on Inquiry be worthy of another *Monteſquieu* to aſſign the Cauſes of the Riſe and Fall of the *French* Monarchy, &c.

the

the *French* Grandeur have owed their Declenſion to the ſame Cauſe; they had attained a greater Power than they had Wiſdom ſufficient to direct; for the ſake of gratifying the paſſion of the Day, they loſt ſight of their laſting Intereſt.

The utmoſt rational Aim of our Ambition, is to poſſeſs a juſt Weight, and Conſideration in *Europe*; and that the Power of the Nation ſhould be rather reſpectable than terrible. To effect this, it muſt not be employed invidiouſly; it muſt operate diſcretely and quietly; then it will be happily felt in its Effects, while it is little ſeen in violent Exertions. The Genius and Diſpoſition of Nations, as well as Men, is beſt diſcerned by the uſe they make of Power. And therefore my great Objection to this Part of your Plan, does not ariſe from the Nature of the thing which you deſire; my Objection is to the Time and Manner in which you inſiſt on having it done; which is, as I apprehend, to ourſelves of no kind of uſe, and therefore arrogant and unreaſonable to the Enemy.

After the Propoſal concerning *Dunkirk*, you lay before the Two Great Men the other Parts of your Plan. And here

you recommend it to them to diſplay their Moderation, by giving up *Guadaloupe*, *Senegal*, and *Goree*; and their Wiſdom, by keeping the Poſſeſſion of every Part of *Canada*. To keep *Canada* is the Point you have principally at heart; * " this is " the Point, ſay you invariably to be ad- " hered to, " this is to be the *ſine qua non* " of the Peace," and unleſs it is, we ſhall " have a *treacherous and deluſive Peace*."

Before I examine the juſtneſs of thoſe Motives that make you ſo ſtrenuouſly attached to this Object, and ſo indifferent to every other; I ſhall beg leave to remark upon the Conſequence you deduce from the Suppoſition of our giving up *Canada*, " that we ſhall then have a treacherous " and deluſive Peace."

The Views which every State ought to have at the making of Peace, may be reduced to two.

1ſt. To attain thoſe Objects for which ſhe went to War. And,

2dly. To receive ſome reaſonable

* Vid. p. 34.

Indem-

Indemnification for the Charges ſhe has incurred, in carrying it on. If ſhe is ſucceſsful ſhe is juſtified in making a Demand of this Nature; but without openly avowing ſome ‡ *Views of Ambition*, no Nation can poſſibly claim more.

This admitted, Sir, I aſk upon the firſt Head; Whether the Poſſeſſion of *Canada*, *properly ſo called*, was ever one of thoſe Objects for which we began the War? Was it ever mentioned as ſuch in any of our Memorials or Declarations, or in any National or Publick Act whatſoever? The true Cauſe of the War, our real and indiſputable Right, is well known. Our Claims were large enough for Poſſeſſion and for Security too. And will you ſay, Sir, that if, in the beginning of theſe Troubles, *France* influenced by a Dread of the Exertion of the *Britiſh* Power, had acknowledged theſe Claims, had given up *Nova Scotia*, or *Acadia*,

‡ P. 4. of the Letter. As his Majeſty entered into the War *not from views of Ambition.*

P. 33. of the Letter. This Plan is perfectly agreeable to that *Moderation* expreſſed by his Majeſty in his Speech. Ibid. *The poſſeſſion of Canada is no view of Ambition.*

with its ancient and true Boundaries, had demoliſhed their Fort in the Province of *New York*, had removed themſelves from the *Ohio* and renounced all claim to that Territory, and that on thoſe Conceſſions the Miniſtry had then ceaſed from Hoſtilities, without making any further Claims, will you ſay that we ſhould have had a treacherous and deluſive Peace? You will hardly venture to aſſert that we ſhould. And is a Peace made after *France* has felt the Force of *Britain*, and ſubmitted to that Force, to be more treacherous and deluſive than if ſhe had made it from an Apprehenſion only of the Conſequences? Is a Peace to be treacherous and deluſive, if we do not get on that Peace, what we never claimed as our Right before the War? Is a Peace treacherous and deluſive that puts us in poſſeſſion of a Territory larger than ſeveral flouriſhing Monarchies? Is a Peace deluſive and treacherous only becauſe ſomething is left to the Enemy?

But you do not aſſert that we have any original Right to *Canada*; nor do you ſay that the Conceſſion of thoſe Boundaries

Boundaries which we have claimed do not give us a vaſt Territory and an advantageous Barrier. You go upon another, which is indeed the only Principle you make uſe of, but which you are of opinion is ſo ſtrong * " as to ſilence the " *French* Plenipotentiaries, and to con- " vince all *Europe* of the juſtice of your " demand."

" Aſk the *French* what Security they " can give you if we reſtore *Canada*, " however reſtrained in its Boundaries, " that they will not again begin to ex- " tend them at our Expence."

The *French* Plenipotentiaries, Sir, muſt be very extraordinary Advocates to be ſilenced, and *Europe* as extraordinary a Judge to be convinced by ſuch an Argument. *France*, Sir, might anſwer, that ſhe can give no ſuch Security. No Nation whilſt independent can give it. And therefore no ſuch Security ſhould be deſired. To deſire the Enemies whole Country upon no othe Principle but that otherwiſe you cannot ſecure your

* P. 3. of the Letter.

own, is turning the Idea of mere Defence into the moſt dangerous of all Principles. It is leaving no Medium between Safety and Conqueſt. It is to ſuppoſe yourſelf never ſafe, whilſt your Neighbour enjoys any Security. Indeed ſuch a Demand, after the Queſtions diſputed in the War have been adjuſted, is an Avowal of ſuch an unreaſonable Ambition, that I truſt you will never be ſeconded in it by any *Engliſh* Man or *Engliſh* Miniſter. For it is a Demand that extends infinitely in its Conſequences, extends (for any thing I can ſee to the contrary), to the utter Deſtruction of Mankind. For whilſt we have *France*, or any other Nation on our Borders either in *Europe* or in *America*, we muſt in the nature of things have frequent Diſputes and Wars with them; and we muſt ſuppoſe, at leaſt, as often as we are ſucceſsful, that the Enemy is in fault; that is, we muſt ſuppoſe the Enemy had provoked us to take Arms by the Violation of ſome Treaty, or by the Invaſion of ſome Right. The Buſineſs of a Peace is to adjuſt and to determine theſe Diſputes; but after the Enemy has agreed to our original Demands,

mands, if we go on to demand Security for the Preſervation of Peace; what leſs do we demand, than that they ſhould yield themſelves bound Hand and Foot up to our Mercy? Let our Borders be ever ſo extended, as long as we have any Nation near us, we muſt have the ſame Diſputes, the ſame Wars, and we muſt demand, upon your Principle, the ſame Security at the Concluſion of a Peace, or more properly ſpeaking, we muſt make ſuch Demands, as will render it abſolutely impoſſible to conclude any Peace at all.

There was a Nation indeed, which I am ſure we reſemble more in Courage, than in Ambition and Injuſtice, which frequently uſed to demand ſuch a Caution: and ſuch a Caution they actually did require from the *Carthaginians*, when they intended it as a Preliminary to the utter Deſtruction of that People, and to the moſt notorious Breach of Faith, upon their own ſide. Their Pretence was exactly yours; that the Enemy was a Nation perfidious to a Proverb; a People whom no Treaty could bind. They uſed the *Punica* in the ſame manner that you do the *Gallica Fides*. I need not inform you, Sir, what followed: it was indeed

impoſſible that ſuch Principles and Pretenſions could end in any thing but the total Deſtruction of the Vanquiſhed.

I do not ſee why the Arguments you employ concerning a Security for their peaceable Behaviour in *Canada*, would not be equally cogent for requiring the ſame Security in *Europe*. They are our Neighbours, and dangerous ones, here, as well as there. The *Low Countries*, *Lorain*, *Alſace*, ſhew us, that the *French* Monarchy has been, at leaſt, as intent upon extending its Dominion in *Europe*, as it can be in *America*. We know that they have tried all the Methods of War, of Treaty, and of Marriages, to enlarge their dangerous Empire. But ſtill, dreaded as they are in *Europe*, (and much more to be dreaded than ever they were in *America*) if we could be ſo happy to ſee, what I fear we never ſhall ſee, a Confederacy to reclaim their Uſurpations, what would we ſay to the Inſolence of thoſe who, on your Principle, ſhould demand all *France* as a Security that they ſhould not make the like Uſurpations for the future.

But, Sir, our real Dependence for keeping

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ing *France*, or any other Nation, true to her Engagements, muſt not be in demanding Securities, which no Nation whilſt independent can give, but on our own Strength and our own Vigilance.

To ſay the Truth, we owe our Loſſes in *America* as much to our own Supineneſs as to the *French* Perfidy. Our Miniſters have heretofore acted in regard to *America*, as if they expected from a Magic in the Contract, that it would perform itſelf. They took no Steps to enforce it. But from the Wiſdom and Vigour of our preſent Adminiſtration, I ſhould expect another Conduct. As ſoon as *France* is happily reduced to cede us ſuch Boundaries as may be thought proper to demand, the ſame Spirit that has conducted the War, will maintain the Terms of the Peace. Inſtead of leaving *France* at liberty to build Forts at her Diſcretion, *Engliſh* Forts will be raiſed at ſuch Paſſes, as may at once make us reſpectable to the *French*, and to the *Indian* Nations. God forbid that we ſhould depend on the Sincerity of our Enemy. Every wiſe Nation will rely on its own Watchfulneſs, and on its own Strength,

to

to maintain the Terms they oblige their Enemy to give them; and whoever expects Security from any other Dependence, will find himſelf the Dupe.

To ſupply any Defect in your Argument for this favourite Meaſure, of retaining *Canada*, you call in the Aid of our *American* Colonies; and tell us, "*though Care ſhould be taken to keep all* "*that we have claimed, ſomething more* "*muſt be done, or our* American *Colonies* "*will tell you, you have done nothing.*" On what Authority this is ſo poſitively aſſerted to be the Language of our *American* Colonies, you have not told us. I hope and believe that you have been miſinformed. But if our *American* Colonies ſhould be ſo abſurd and ungrateful as to tell us, after all the Blood and Treaſure expended in their Cauſe, that we do nothing, if we do not make Conqueſts for them, they muſt be taught a Leſſon of greater Moderation. If with a Superiority of at leaſt ten to one, with a vaſt and advantageous Barrier, with the proper Precautions to ſtrengthen it, under the Protection of a great Naval Power, they cannot think themſelves ſecure, they muſt blame their own

own Cowardice or Ignorance, and not the Meaſures of their Mother Country; who is bound to provide for their Happineſs and Security, but not for their vain Ambition, or their groundleſs Fears.

The Idea of ſecuring yourſelf, only by having no other Nation near you, is, I admit, an Idea of *American* Extraction. It is the genuine Policy of Savages; and it is owing to this Policy, that *England* and *France* are able at this Day to diſpute the Sovereignty of Deſerts in *America*.

As we do not pretend to claim *Canada* upon an original Right, ſo neither is it neceſſary to our ſecutity. For, that we can very rationally ſecure ourſelves in *North America* without the Poſſeſſion of *Canada*, will, Iapprehend, require very few Arguments to demonſtrate. I have already obſerved upon the vaſt Superiority of Men which we have there; ſuch Superiority, that I am always aſtoniſhed when I think on the unaccountable Conduct which has made *France* an Enemy to be apprehended on that Continent. We are in *North America* not only a greater Naval, but a far greater Continental Power. Our Superiority in

Point

Point of Situation is no leſs viſible. If added to theſe Advantages, we acquire on a Peace all thoſe important Poſts and Communications, by which alone *Canada* became in any Degree dangerous to us, I cannot ſee why *Canada*, weakened, ſtripped, confined, and I may ſay bound down, will not be infinitely in more Danger, in caſe of any Rupture between the two Nations, from our Colonies, than ours can be from theirs.

I cannot help obſerving, that among all your Ideas of Security, and anxious as you are for the Security of *North America* in particular, you ſhew little regard to that of the *Weſt Indies*. Our *Caribbee* Iſlands muſt ever be infinitely in greater Danger from *Guadaloupe*, than our *North American* Colonies can be from *Canada* circumſcribed as it ought, and as it is preſumed, it will be. The *French* have a real Superiority in the *Weſt Indies*, and they have at times made it to be ſeverely felt.

If, as it has been ſhewn, we may beyond any rational Fear ſecure ourſelves without the intire Poſſeſſion of *Canada*, we can deſire it in Preference to our other Con-

Conqueſts only on Account of its ſuperior Value. Though you have not at all inſiſted on this, yet leſt this may be thought one of your Motives to that great Preference, and it is ſure, the beſt Motive you could have had, we will conſider the Point ſomewhat at large, and this will bring us to the ſecond of thoſe leading Ideas, that ought to guide a Nation in a Treaty of Peace; that is, *to acquire a proper Indemnification for the Expences of the War.* You are not one of the Number of thoſe who think we ought to give up nothing in a Peace. You do not claim *Canada* on a Principle of Right. We have examined it on the Principle of Security. The only Queſtion that now remains to be diſputed between us, is, whether *Canada* be a better Indemnification for the Expences of the War, than all our other Conqueſts put together; for you give up all the reſt with great Eaſe, and inſiſt on this alone.

Before we enter into a Compariſon between the Value of our Acquiſitions in the *Weſt Indies* and thoſe in *Canada*, I muſt beg leave to take ſome notice of your Reaſon, your only Reaſon, for giving

giving up the Iſland of *Guadaloupe**, "that we have already ſo many Sugar "Iſlands of our own." If any Argument could poſſibly be drawn from our having Abundance of Territory, ſurely it holds much more ſtrongly with regard to *North America*, where one of our Provinces alone, has more Land than ours, and all the *French* Sugar Iſlands put together. If we have in the *Weſt Indies* Land enough for Sugar, ſurely we have Land enough in *North America* for the far leſs valuable Commodities, which are produced on that vaſt Continent. From what Motives you are pleaſed to think the keeping a great Sugar Iſland an Acquiſition of little Conſequence, I am unable to comprehend. You know ſurely that in one of our Iſlands, the greateſt of them, we labour under a ſort of Monopoly, and under other Diſadvantages, hard, if not

* P. 33. of the Letter. The Poſſeſſion of *Guadaloupe*, an additional Sugar Iſland, when we have ſo many of our own, ought not to be inſiſted upon ſo ſtrenuouſly as to make it a neceſſary Condition of the Peace; and though *Senegal* and *Goree* are of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own *African* Settlements have hitherto ſupplied us with Slaves ſufficient for our *American* Purpoſes.

impoſſible to be remedied. You know that another Iſland, I mean *Barbadoes*, formerly one of our beſt, is at preſent much exhauſted; ſo that the Produce, and the Profit made on that Produce, diminiſhes daily; and that the reſt, except perhaps *Antigua*, are quite inconſiderable; ſo inconſiderable, that the Iſlands, which as dependents on *Guadaloupe* are ſcarce mentioned, are much more valuable. It was no ſooner found that the King of *Denmark* was intent on ſettling the Iſland of *Santa Cruz*, than ſome conſiderable Planters immediately removed thither, and it is now almoſt wholly ſettled by the *Engliſh*. Many have actually Intereſts in *Martinico*; and *Guadaloupe* was ſcarce taken, when our Planters flocked thither, and immediately made conditional § Purchaſes, ſenſible of the Superiority of this Iſland and the Defects of our own.

In Conſequence of thoſe Wants, and

§ I ſay *conditional*, becauſe the Capitulation has rendered it impoſſible to make an abſolute Purchaſe; but they have already made Contracts to purchaſe, if the Iſland remains to us, and have taken poſſeſſion of Plantations by virtue of ſuch Contracts.

Diſ-

Diſadvantages, our Sugar Iſlands produce little more than what ſerves the home Conſumption; and that too at a very advanced Price. From the foreign Market we have before this War been almoſt wholly excluded. *France* ſupplied all the Markets of *Europe*, and ſupplied them in a great meaſure from the Produce of this very Iſland, which you eſteem ſo lightly. When we conſider Things in a Commercial Light, it is the foreign Market which ought certainly to have the greateſt Influence. Thoſe who ſupply the home Conſumption purvey to our Luxury: thoſe who ſupply the foreign Market adminiſter to our Wealth and to our Power.

To ſhew you, Sir, how much the Sugar Trade might contribute to the Wealth and Power of any Nation, by what it formerly did contribute to ours, and what for a long Time paſt it has contributed to that of *France*, I will lay before you ſome Facts; Facts, Sir, which are of a Nature infinitely more convincing than the moſt lively Sallies of Eloquence. About the time of the Treaty of *Utrecht* we ſupplied the greateſt part of

of the Sugar Conſumption throughout *Europe*. *France*, far from contending with us in the foreign Market, took from us a great part of what ſhe uſed at home. From the year 1715 to 1719 we exported one Year with another 18580 Hogſheads of Sugar. From 1719 to 1722 we fell to leſs than half; for we ſent abroad but 9064 *communibus Annis*. We continued regularly on the decreaſe to 1739, in which Year our Sugar Export had fallen to 4078 Hogſheads. Since that time, it has fallen almoſt to nothing. Now let us turn the other ſide, and view the Sugar Trade of *France* ſince the ſame Period, the Treaty of *Utrecht*. At that time the *French* exported no Sugars. But mark, Sir, the Revolution. In 1740, when the *Britiſh* Trade in that Article was in a manner annihilated; *France*, after ſerving her Home Conſumption at a very eaſy Rate, exported no leſs than 80,000 Hogſheads of Sugar, which, with the Gains of the Commiſſion, &c. was reputed to be worth to *France* more than a Million Sterling, to employ 40,000 Ton of Shipping, and 4000 Seamen, ſolely in bringing it from the *Weſt Indies* to *Europe*. Theſe, Sir, are Facts that proclaim loudly the Advantage of thoſe Iſlands to *France* whilſt they were in her Poſſeſſion; and

declare no leſs ſtrongly the Advantages which muſt accrue to *Britain*, if ſhe could attain the Poſſeſſion of one of the very beſt of them. Facts theſe, that ought not to be paſſed lightly, until you can ſhew ſomething like them, in favour of the Plan you ſo warmly embrace. I therefore Sir, cannot help thinking that your Reaſons for rejecting *Guadaloupe*, on the Principle *of our having Sugar Land enough*, are not near ſo ſtrong, nor the Matter ſo well weighed, as the Importance of the Queſtion deſerves.

But let us ſee what the Value of this *Canada* is, in Compariſon of which you reject all our other Acquiſitions.

Unluckily for your Argument, you yourſelf inform * us at your ſetting out, that the *French* ſet very little Value upon this Poſſeſſion, and that they have even deliberated, whether it ſhould not be entirely abandoned.

If in the Hands of the *French*, who have no other Northern Colony, from whence to ſupply their Iſlands with

* P. 30, and 33.

Lumber,

Lumber, Corn, and Proviſion, *Canada* was of ſo very little Importance, what is it like to prove in ours, who have already ſuch immenſe Tracts, and thoſe too ſo much more conveniently ſituated for that Trade, and who can eaſily ſupply five times the Conſumption of ours, theirs, and all the other *Weſt India* Iſlands put together; and that too at a much eaſier Rate than they can poſſibly have theſe Things from *Canada?* But I do not inſiſt upon this Argument, though it is ſtrong againſt you, becauſe I do not believe that *France* has ſuch a diſregard for this their only conſiderable Poſſeſſion in *North America*. It is a great while ſince they thought of giving it up; and they are long convinced that it is of ſome uſe to them, independent of their Hopes of encroaching on our Poſſeſſions. Aſk thoſe, Sir, who lately ſaw *Canada*, if it had the Face of a Colony which the Mother Country was weary of holding? I believe, Sir, they will tell you that the Cultivation of the Lands, the Number and Neatneſs of the Houſes, the warm Condition of the Inhabitants, by no Means ſeemed to imply that they were neglected by *France*; but evinced rather that this Colony was the Object of her very tender Concern.

But there are, independent of the Opinion or Deſigns of *France*, many Reaſons why we ſhould not think *Canada* ſo valuable an Acquiſition as our Conqueſt in the *Weſt Indies*. *Canada*, ſituated in a cold Climate, produces no Commodity, except Furs and Skins, which ſhe can exchange for the Commodities of *Europe*; and conſequently ſhe can have ſmall Returns to make to the *Engliſh* Merchant. We know what trifling Returns we have, from ſome of our own very flouriſhing Colonies in *America*. The whole Trade of Furs and Skins, which *Canada* carried on with *France*, fell ſhort, in its moſt flouriſhing State, of 140,000l. a Year. The reſt of their Produce, with regard to the Market of *Europe*, is as nothing. It is worthy of obſervation, that a very great Part of the Value of thoſe Furs was returned from *France* in the Article of Brandy, without which, the Trade with the *Indians* for their Beaver and Deer Skins could not be carried on. But as an *Engliſh* Plantation, *Canada* muſt ſupply itſelf, as all the other *Engliſh* Plantations do, with Rum; elſe they will be obliged intirely to relinquiſh the Fur and Peltry Trade, which is the only valuable Trade they have. But let it be conſidered how

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the People of *Canada* can come to the *Weſt India* Market from the bottom of the River St. *Laurence*, with the groſs and cheap Article of Lumber and Corn, on a footing with our Colonies, many of which are not three Weeks Sail from the *Leeward* Iſlands. They could neither trade with *Europe*, nor with the *Weſt Indies*, with any tolerable Advantage: not with the *Weſt Indies*, becauſe they muſt be underſold in that Market; not with *Europe*, becauſe being ſo underſold they cannot have the Rum that is neceſſary for the *Indian* Trade, which keeps up their Commerce with *Europe*.

Indeed whilſt *Canada* is in the Hands of *France*, the Skin Trade may be kept up ſo as to be an Object; becauſe the Return for thoſe Commodities, brings back the Brandy with which they are purchaſed: and thus the Trade is kept alive by a continual Circulation. The bulkier Articles of Corn and Lumber may likewiſe continue a Branch of their Trade, becauſe it is their Intereſt to ſupport by every Method the Vent of theſe Articles in their *Weſt India* Iſlands in Preference to Foreigners. But *Canada* in our Hands can have no ſuch Preference,

and therefore from its Situation cannot be on an Equality in the *Weſt India* Market; from which Market alone it is, that they, as a *Britiſh* Poſſeſſion, can derive the Spirits, or thoſe Materials for Spirits, without which the Fur and Peltry, their only Trade, muſt certainly periſh. Theſe Principles appear to me ſo well grounded, that I think it no Preſumption to propheſy, "if that Place ſhould ever "be ours, the Fur Trade of *Canada* muſt "inevitably come to little or nothing in "a few Years.

But let us extend our View a little farther; let us ſuppoſe that inſtead of aiming at the entire Poſſeſſion of *North America*, we confine ourſelves to thoſe Limits which we have always claimed there; and that *Canada* is reſtored to *France*, curtailed in ſuch a manner as to ſecure the *Ohio* Country, and the Communication of the Lakes. It is well known to thoſe who have any Knowledge of *American* Affairs, that the Country to the Southward of Lake *Erie*, and near the *Ohio*, is the greateſt *Indian* Hunting Country in *North America*. If this Territory ſhould remain with us on a Peace, it naturally draws to us all that Trade which

which depends upon the Hunting of Deer and Beaver. If this Country ſhould be further ſecured to us, by the Poſſeſſion of *Niagara*, which is a Poſt of infinite Importance, and intirely commands the great Lakes of *Erie* and *Ontario*, I cannot ſee how it is poſſible to keep the far greater Part of the Commerce of *North America* out of our Hands. The *Indians* muſt every where be intercepted before they can arrive at the *French* Colony, even ſuppoſing (what can never be) that the *French* could entice them thither by ſelling cheaper than our Dealers.

Thus without aiming at the total Poſſeſſion of *Canada*, by eſtabliſhing proper Limits, and by ſecuring them properly, we may draw to ourſelves a great Part of that Trade which muſt give *Canada* itſelf any Value, in the Eyes of a commercial Nation.

So that the Queſtion, Sir, is not, whether *Canada* extended to the Ocean by a Poſſeſſion of the River St. *John*, and a great Part of *Nova Scotia*, encroaching upon, and menacing *New York* and *New England*, commanding excluſively all the

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Lakes and Rivers, whether ſuch a Country ought to be kept in Preference to *Guadaloupe*, but whether *Canada*, ſtripped of theſe Advantages, and confined to its proper Limits, confined to the *Northward* of thoſe Lakes, and Rivers, be a better Acquiſition than our rich Conqueſt in the *Weſt Indies*.

If we compare the Returns of *Canada*, even whilſt it flouriſhed moſt by its Encroachments upon us, with thoſe of *Guadaloupe*, we ſhall find their Value in no Degree of Competition. The Fur Trade, whoſe Value is before mentioned, is its whole Trade to *Europe*. But *Guadaloupe*, beſides the great Quantities of Sugars, Cotton, Indigo, Coffee, and Ginger, which it ſends to Market, carries on a Trade with the *Caracca's* and other Parts of the *Spaniſh* Main, which is a Trade wholly in the Manufactures of *Europe*, and the Returns for which, are made almoſt wholly in ready Money. Without eſtimating the Land, the Houſes, the Works, and the Goods in the Iſland, the Slaves, at the loweſt Valuation, are worth upwards of one Million two hundred and fifty thouſand Pounds ſterling. It is a known Fact that they make more

Sugar

Sugar in *Guadaloupe*, than in any of our Iſlands, except *Jamaica*. This Branch of their Trade alone, beſides the Employment of ſo much Shipping, and ſo many Seamen, will produce clear 300,000 l. *per Annum* to our Merchants. For, as we have ſufficient from our own Iſlands, to ſupply our Home Conſumption, the whole Sugar Produce of *Guadaloupe* will neceſſarily be exported: and will conſequently be ſo much clear Money to *Great Britain*. Sir, the whole Produce of *Canada*, though it were all exported from *England*, and exported compleatly *manufactured*, would not amount to the Value of that ſingle Article *unmanufactured:* nor would it employ the one twentieth Part of the Shipping, and the Seamen. But this, though the largeſt, and the moſt valuable, is not the only Produce of *Guadaloupe*; Coffee, which in our Iſlands is a very inconſiderable Object, is there a very great one. They raiſe likewiſe great Quantities of Indigo and Cotton, which ſupply Materials for our beſt and moſt valuable Manufactures, and which employ many more Hands than the Increaſe of the Hat Trade, propoſed by the keeping *Canada*, can do. This Iſland is capable in our Hands,

of

of being improved to double its preſent Value; whereas *Canada* in our Hands would not probably yield half what it did to *France*.

There is, Sir, one Argument I would uſe particularly to you, who are ſo ſtrongly ſenſible of the Inconveniences we are liable to, from the Situation of *Dunkirk*. Surely there is not a ſingle Word you ſay, in reſpect to *Dunkirk*, that does not hold as ſtrongly in regard to *Guadaloupe*, ſituated in the very Heart of our *Leeward* Iſlands, and there infeſting one of the moſt advantageous Branches of the *Britiſh* Commerce. If I may be allowed the Expreſſion, *Guadaloupe* is the *Dunkirk* of the *Weſt Indies*. It is not to be denied but that the *Engliſh* Coaſter and the *London* Trader has ſuffered by the *Dunkirk* Privateers; but their Loſſes this War have not been near ſo conſiderable as that of the *Weſt Indies*, and above all of the *North American* Traders, whoſe Intereſt, I believe, you will not diſpute to be of ſome Importance. Aſk, Sir, the *North American* Traders, aſk the People of the *Leeward* Iſlands, what a vaſt Security they thought it to their Trade, that *Guadaloupe* ſhould be in our Hands? Our Iſlands were ſo annoyed from

from thence, that they ſcarce conſidered it in any other Light than as a Neſt of Privateers: thoſe who went thither from our Settlements were ſurpriſed to find a People richer than in any of our own Iſlands; and Land ſo much better than their own, that many of our rich Planters have already made ‡ conditional Purchaſes there.

Not to confine our Views ſolely to a Commercial Point, give me leave to mention one great Advantage, that in a political light may ariſe from our Poſſeſſion of *Guadaloupe*. It is very well known that the Hand of Government is heavy on the Proteſtants of *France*. Many of theſe People are already eſtabliſhed in this Iſland, and they have Connexions of every Kind with thoſe of their own Perſuaſion at Home. And may we not hope and expect that this may be an Inducement to many others, to make this their Retreat, and that the Colony may be enriched and ſtrengthened at the expence of *France*.

In ſhort, Sir, in whatever light you view the Iſland of *Guadaloupe*, you will

‡ Vid. Page 31, the Note.

find

find it a moſt valuable and a moſt deſireable Object. Do you aſk to deprive your Enemy of an advantageous Poſt, from whence he might materially moleſt your Trade in Time of War? Do you wiſh to extend your Trade in Time of Peace, and to have a new Market for all your Manufactures? From being ſcarce able to ſupply the Home Conſumption with Sugar, do you deſire to be foremoſt at the foreign Market? This Iſland, Sir, of *Guadaloupe*, that you eſteem ſo little, will anſwer all theſe Ends; Ends ſo material, that I truſt, Sir, the Stone you have rejected, will be made the Corner Stone in the Temple of Peace.

I muſt therefore repeat it, Sir, that I am not a little ſurprized you ſhould paſs over in a manner ſo careleſs, and with ſuch extreme Superficiality, a Point ſo very material and intereſting as this, and tell us that * "the Poſſeſſion of *Guadaloupe*, "*an additional Sugar Iſland, when we have* "*ſo many of our own, ought not to be ſo* "*ſtrenuouſly inſiſted upon as to make it a* "*neceſſary Condition of the Peace.*" Had

* P. 33.

you

you taken the Pains to inform yourſelf of the Facts neceſſary for making a Judgment on this Matter, or had you duly attended to them, you could not poſſibly have ſaid that it was not to be inſiſted upon, and in the ſame Breath aſſert, that without *Canada* we ſhould have a treacherous and deluſive Peace.

You ſay a great deal, and with Reaſon, upon the Value of our * *North American* Colonies, and the great Increaſe our Trade has had from that Quarter. But you paſs by with very little notice, how much both the Trade of *England*, and even the Trade of theſe very *North American* Colonies, owes to the Iſlands.

You look upon theſe Iſlands only as an inferior dependent Part of the *Britiſh* Plantations, which you ſcarce think worth while to mention; but becauſe I think you are under ſome miſtake in this Point,

* Vid Pag. 34 of the Letter. If notwithſtanding our having loſt ſeveral Branches of Commerce we formerly enjoyed in *Europe* and to the *Levant*, we have ſtill more Commerce than ever, a greater Demand for our Manufactures, and a vaſt Increaſe of our Shipping, what can this be owing to but to the Trade of our own *American* Colonies?

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in addition to thoſe Reaſons which have been given to ſhew the Preference of *Guadaloupe* in particular to *Canada*, there are ſome Facts, which I beg leave to ſubmit to your Obſervation, concerning *Settlements* on the Continent of *North America* and Plantations in the *Weſt Indian* Iſlands. Though it may be a new Idea, I ſhall not heſitate to ſay, that an *Iſland Colony*, is always more advantageous than a Continental one, for the Mother Country, as being more attached by their Intereſt, and more eaſily ſupported.

The Inhabitants of the *Weſt Indian* Iſlands never conſider themſelves as at home there; they ſend their Children to the Mother Country for Education; they themſelves make many Trips to the Mother Country to recover their Health or enjoy their Fortunes; if they have Ambition, 'tis hither they come to gratify it. I need not, I ſuppoſe, obſerve to you, how many Gentlemen of the *Weſt Indies* have Seats in the *Britiſh* Houſe of Commons. I might I believe venture to ſay, there are very few who have inherited Plantations in any of our Iſlands, who have not had an *European* Education, or at leaſt have not ſpent ſome Time in this Kingdom.

Kingdom. Many who have Plantations, receive and ſpend the whole Profits of them here, without ever ſeeing the *Weſt Indies*. If the Commerce with the *Weſt Indian* Iſlands had even been in ſome reſpects againſt us, this Circumſtance alone would turn the Ballance in our favour; but this in truth is very far from being the Caſe. The Trade we carry on with that Part of the World, is as happily circumſtanced as Imagination could form it. The *Weſt India* Iſlands lie in a Climate different totally from ours. The natural Produce therefore interferes in no reſpect with that of *England*. Their Produce is only ſuch, as our Taſte and the Turn of our Manners call for. Indeed a great Article of that Produce enters ſo much into the ordinary Food of all Ranks of our People, that if we had it not from our own Colonies, we ſhould be under a neceſſity of purchaſing it from Strangers. The Commerce between the Mother Country and a *Weſt Indian* Iſland is natural and eaſy: it needs in no reſpect to be forced or managed; they are mutually formed for each other: neither is there any ſort of fear that the Iſlands in that part of the World ſhould ever make this Commerce leſs eaſy or leſs advantageous.

tageous. The extreme Dearneſs of Proviſion will never ſuffer them, how much ſoever they may be inclined, to ſet up any Manufacture which may interfere with our own. So that theſe Colonies, by their very Nature, Situation, and Products, by what they have, and by what they want, are kept neceſſarily connected with and dependent upon *England*, and muſt ever be ſo, as long as we are able to protect them.

Let us now examine, Sir, whether the greateſt part of the Plantations which we poſſeſs or deſire in *North America*, can come in competition with the Iſlands, either in the Advantages we derive from them, or in the Certainty of holding thoſe Advantages. With regard to the Eſtates in *North America* ſpent in *England*, I may affirm that from *Nova Scotia* to *Maryland* and *Virginia* there are abſolutely none; yet in this Tract are, the four Provinces of *New England*, the great Countries of *New York*, *Penſylvania*, and the two *Jerſeys*, Places highly flouriſhing in Commerce, and abounding with People: even to the Southward of this Line there are very few Eſtates ſpent in *England*.

In

In *North America* the Climate is not unfavourable to an *European* Conſtitution, and it is a Country in which Men fond of Rural Diverſions may paſs their time agreeably. The truth is, though their Eſtates ſupply them abundantly to live at home, they do not furniſh Money enough to ſend them abroad. I do not remember that this vaſt Continent ſupplies our Houſe of Commons with a ſingle Member.

To view the Continent of *America* in a Commercial Light, the Produce of all the Northern Colonies is the ſame as that of *England*, Corn and Cattle: and therefore, except for a very few naval Stores, there is but little Trade from thence directly to *England*. Their own Commodities bear a very low Price, Goods carried from *Europe* bear a very high Price; and thus they are of Neceſſity driven to ſet up Manufactures ſimilar to thoſe of *England*, in which they are favoured by Cheapneſs of Proviſions. In fact, there are Manufactures of many Kinds in theſe Northern Colonies, that promiſe in a ſhort Time to ſupply their Home Conſumption. From *New England* they begin even to export ſome things manufactured, particularly Hats, in ſome Quantity. In

theſe Provinces they have Colleges and Academies for the Education of their Youth; and as they increaſe daily in People and in Induſtry, the Neceſſity of a Connection with *England*, with which they have no natural Intercourſe by a Reciprocation of Wants, will continually diminiſh. But as they recede from the Sea, all theſe Cauſes will operate more ſtrongly; they will have nothing to expect from Commerce, they muſt live wholly on their own Labour, and in proceſs of Time will know little, enquire little, and care little about the Mother Country.

If, Sir, the People of our Colonies find no Check from *Canada*, they will extend themſelves, almoſt, without bounds into the Inland Parts. They are invited to it by the Pleaſantneſs, the Fertility, and the Plenty of that Country; and they will increaſe infinitely from all theſe Cauſes. What the Conſequence will be, to have a numerous, hardy, independent People, poſſeſſed of a ſtrong Country, communicating little, or not at all with *England*, I leave to your own Reflections. I hope we have not gone to theſe immenſe Expences, without any Idea of ſecuring the Fruits of them to Poſterity. If we have, I am ſure we have acted with little Fru-

gality or Foreſight. This is indeed a Point that muſt be the conſtant Object of the Miniſter's Attention, but is not a fit Subject for a publick Diſcuſſion. I will therefore expatiate no farther on this Topic; I ſhall only obſerve, that by eagerly graſping at extenſive Territory, we may run the riſque, and that perhaps in no very diſtant Period, of loſing what we now poſſeſs. The Poſſeſſion of *Canada*, far from being neceſſary to our Safety, may in its Conſequence be even dangerous. A Neighbour that keeps us in ſome Awe, is not always the worſt of Neighbours. So that far from ſacrificing *Guadaloupe* to *Canada*, perhaps if we might have *Canada* without any Sacrifice at all, we ought not to deſire it.

We ought in all Reaſon to be as attentive to our internal Government in *America*, as to that outward Security for which you are ſo anxious, but for which you have propoſed a Plan defective in Point of Expediency and Juſtice, and even defective upon thoſe miſtaken Principles of Security on which you build. For if we can have no Security whilſt the *French* have any Place from whence they may invade our Colonies, you ought to have carried your Demands ſtill fur-

ther; you ought to have demanded the whole Country of *Louiſiana*; becauſe from thence, if we are only to reaſon from our Fears, *France* undoubtedly may invade our Colonies, and what is of more Conſideration the weakeſt of our Colonies, thoſe to the *Southward*. If the Fear of ſuch an Invaſion be, as it is, your only Reaſon for demanding *Canada*, you have not demanded enough, and your Plan is as defective upon your own Principles, as it is exceſſive on Principles of Moderation and Equity.

But theſe Points are not to be diſcuſſed between *France* and *England* only. There are other Powers who will probably think themſelves intereſted in the Deciſion of this Affair. There is a Balance of Power in *America* as well as in *Europe*, which will not be forgotten; and this is a Point I ſhould have expected would ſomewhat have engaged your Attention.

With regard to *Senegal* and *Goree*, I concur with you in not making them the principal Object of our Negotiations at the Congreſs * for a Peace; but it is up-

* P. 33. Senegal and Goree, though of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own

on Principles very different from yours. You deſpiſe the *African* Trade, and conſiſtently enough, becauſe you lay little weight on that of the *Weſt Indies*, which is ſupported by it; but the Reduction of the Price of Slaves, the whole Trade of Gum thrown into our Hands, and the Increaſe in that of Gold and Ivory, would make even thoſe Places a far better Purchaſe than *Canada*, as might poſſibly be ſhewn without much difficulty. But I do not inſiſt upon it, becauſe I think we ought to be as moderate in the Terms of Peace, as is conſiſtent with a reaſonable Indemnification, and becauſe too I know in the Nature of Things, that it is impoſſible to retain all. In one word, I will not venture, Sir, to ſay, *we have a treacherous and deluſive Peace*, unleſs that Peace is made in Conformity to my Ideas; for there may be Reaſons that neither you, nor I, Sir, can poſſibly be acquainted with, which may make theſe Points not proper to be inſiſted upon; but I will take upon me, Sir, to ſay, that if by

African Settlements have hitherto ſupplied us with Slaves ſufficient for our *American* Purpoſes; and the Gum Trade is not perhaps of Conſequence enough to make us amends for the annual Mortality which wealready lament of our brave Countrymen to guard our *African* Conqueſts.

this War we gain *Guadaloupe*, we make as great an Acquiſition as ever this Nation has made by any Treaty or any War, and if it is poſſible to retain this, we need not aſk for more.

At a Congreſs, Sir, in the Face of that Auguſt Aſſembly, formed by the Repreſentatives of the Chriſtian World, we ſhall there exhibit ourſelves in our real Character; we ſhall there ſhew all the Powers of *Europe* what they are to expect from us, and how far they ought to wiſh the Continuance and Increaſe of our Greatneſs. Therefore any ſhew of arrogant Superiority, any unmeaſurable Claim, any avaricious Graſping, though they may ſeem immediately to fall upon *France*, are in effect Menaces to every other Power. But if Moderation is neceſſary there, when the War is ended, and when we act as a Nation, how much more neceſſary is it to private Men, whilſt the War ſtill continues with that Uncertainty, which muſt always attend the moſt proſperous Fortune. You cannot forget in this very Year, what an Aſpect our Affairs in *Germany* wore, before the glorious Battle of *Minden*; and you cannot be ignoranthow much this would have affected us in a Negotiation for Peace. Things are

not yet decided there; they look indeed favourable, but not favourable enough, either with regard to his Majeſty's Army, and ſtill leſs with regard to the King of *Pruſſia*, to entitle you to preſcribe Terms in the Stile of a *Roman* Dictator, even if any Fortune could entitle you to do ſo. Let us, Sir, uſe a little Moderation in our happy Hour, that we may at all Events preſerve an Uniformity of Conduct, and not ſeem to act meanly, if any reverſe of Fortune ſhould *oblige* us to be moderate. *France*, Sir, though beaten in all Quarters of the World, defeated both by Sea and Land; though the Credit of her Arms and her Finances are impaired, ſhe is not yet totally ruined: nor, as I conceive, brought ſo low as ſhe was in the War of Queen *Anne*. Yet, Sir, you will be pleaſed to remember, that by the haughty Demeanor, the unreaſonable Expectations, the arrogant, I may ſay, ridiculous Demands of the Allies, the happy Hour for making Peace on the moſt advantageous Conditions was ſuffered to eſcape; until Faction had Time to raiſe its Head in *England*, the Poſture of Affairs to change Abroad, and the Fortune of the War to vary in ſo many Particulars, that the Reſult of all our Succeſs and Arrogance was —the Treaty

of *Utrecht*. The M. *de Torcy*'s Memoirs give a lively Picture of this Conduct and all its Conſequences.

I have, Sir, attentively, and I hope it will be allowed fairly, examined your principal Arguments. You will give me leave now to obſerve a little upon ſome Things of leſs Conſequence, which lye detached from one another through out your Performance.

I reſpect the Zeal which you ſhew for the Intereſt of your Country: but I think that Zeal has tranſported you much too far in your Reflections on the Conduct and Capacities of our Nobility. We allow the Affluence of their Fortunes has betrayed many into a life of Diſſipation; we allow that Luxury is the natural conſequence of Riches; conſult the Hiſtory of Mankind you will find, this has been the complaint of all Ages and all Countries: the Complaint was perhaps never made in any Age or Country with leſs reaſon than in ours. The very Nature of our Conſtitution obliges our Nobility to be in ſome ſort Men of Buſineſs. Many of them are Men of extenſive Knowledge, and profound Learning; in ſhort, to be abſolutely ignorant, or idle, is not

the faſhion of the times. Every Man exerts himſélf in ſome degree, and where that is the caſe, ſome Talents muſt appear. We have in fact found, that notwithſtanding the faults, which, whether juſtly or unjuſtly, have been imputed to us, we have not wanted Heads or Hands to direct and execute our Military Operations. Why ſhould we then apprehend that the Genius of our Country will forſake us at the moment that we are to reap the Benefit of all our Suceſſes, at our entrance into a Negotiation for Peace.

This War is principally, with regard to us at leaſt, an *American* War. When I conſider this, I own my Eyes are led, as I believe thoſe of moſt Perſons are, to the few who from their Inclinations, their Studies, their Opportunities, and their Talents, are made perfectly Maſters of the State and Intereſts of our Colonies. Nor can we, when we caſt our Eye on the noble Perſon to whom we owe the judicious Settlement of that frontier Colony, whoſe Capital gratefully bears the Title of its Founder, by any Means deſpair of an able Plenipotentiary at a Congreſs, where for the firſt Time, our own national Intereſt will be the principal Object of Negotiation.

I admire, Sir, with you, the noble Struggle which that great Prince our Ally in this War, has made againſt ſuch a Combination of great Powers as meant to deſtroy him. I could wiſh for his Virtues, and profeſs I almoſt expect from his Abilities, that he will ſtill extricate himſelf from all the Toils that ſurround him.

It muſt, however, be remembered, that it is not to his Connection with us, that he owes his Diſtreſs. His Dominions have not, like the Electorate of *Hanover*, in reſentment of *Great Britain*, been ravaged by * *the Contributions of the rapacious Richlieu*, or been marked out *for the Military Deſert of Belleiſle*. He has not, like the unhappy Prince of *Heſſe*, been twice driven out of his Country for adhering firmly to *Great Britain*, and in a Quarrel intirely *Britiſh*. We found him beſet with Enemies, our Intereſts coincided, we made an Alliance, I am ſure he has already found in *Great Britain* a moſt uſeful Ally, and I believe he always will find in her an Ally faithful to her Engagements. But, Sir, there is a bound to every thing, †*Let us*, in your own Words, *learn for the future to prefer our own Intereſt to that of others; to proportion our Expences on the*

* P. 39. of the Letter. † Ibid. p. 42.

Continent to the immediate Expences of our own Country, and never to aſſiſt a New Ally without remembering how much we did for our Old one, and what return we have had. We ſee plainly, Sir, by the Conduct of *Great Britain* at this Hour, that the Miniſtry is not inclined to let this Prince fall for want of a due Aſſiſtance; but ſure while we aſſiſt him ſo materially in *Europe*, we are not bound to ſacrifice our Intereſts in every other Part of the World. It may be a ‡ *popular Doctrine*, but I hope, it is not a Doctrine that will be received.

* Enthuſiaſm, Sir, is a noble Motive to Action, but good Senſe and Knowledge only muſt direct the Buſineſs of a Negotiation. The Proteſtant Cauſe maintained itſelf before the King of *Pruſſia* was conſidered as its Protector;

‡ P. 40, 41. of the Letter. I would inculcate *a Doctrine* which I think will not be *unpopular*, and which therefore, I hope, will not be oppoſed by our Miniſters, that *whatever Conqueſt* we have made, and whatever Conqueſt we may ſtill make upon the *French*, except *North America*, *which muſt be kept all our own*, ſhould be looked upon as given back to *France* for a valuable Conſideration, *if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Pruſſia from* any unforeſeen Diſtreſſes.

* P. 41. of the Letter. Perhaps my Notions on this Subject border on *Enthuſiaſm*: the Ruin of the King of *Pruſſia* will be ſoon followed by the Ruin of the Proteſtant Religion in the *Empire*.

and I truſt it will ſtill be able to ſupport itſelf independent of him; it will indeed always find a ſurer Support in the jarring Intereſt of the ſeveral Powers of *Europe*, which will certainly never ceaſe, than in the Faith of any Prince, which will be always ſubject to change.

Many material Circumſtances of that famous ‡ Oppoſition in our Parliament to which you allude, are indeed but little known. It is a Period about which no man is uninquiſitive. Your Deſcription of the Medley which compoſed that Oppoſition, is ſpirited, lively, and I doubt not, juſt: If you were yourſelf engaged in that Struggle, *when you had driven the common Enemy to the Wall*, whether you found it convenient at that Time to quit your Friends, or whether you thought yourſelf deſerted by them, Time enough is now elapſed to have forgotten political Friendſhips, and perhaps too, to have worn out Party Reſentments; and in an Age ſo fond of Anecdotes, and ſo curious in Characters, I may venture to aſſure you nothing will be more acceptable than a *true Hiſtory of that whole Tranſaction.*

‡ P. 35. of the Letter, vide Note. The true Hiſtory of this Tranſaction here alluded to, may poſſibly ſome time or other appear; though, as yet, we are perſuaded that the World knows very little of it.

It was indeed no undeſirable Time to have lived in, when a Field was opened for every Man to diſplay his Abilities, and exert his Talents; if we give the Reins to our Ambition, we ſhould, Sir, regret that where *ſo many ſkillful Champions uſed formerly to engage and ſtruggle for Victory, one Man ſhould at this Day remain ſingle in the Field of Battle.* But alas, Sir, however mortifying this may be to us as Men; ſurely as citizens we muſt rejoice that the great Man, to whoſe active Spirit we in a great meaſure owe all our Glory, our Succeſs, I had almoſt ſaid our very Safety, is able to employ his whole time againſt the Enemies of his Country, without giving a Moment's Care to provide for his own Safety. If we conſider it, in this Light, Sir, ſure it muſt be a moſt pleaſing Contemplation to think, that * "the Extinction of fac- "tious Oppoſition, the Unanimity of "every Party, and the Acquieſcence of "every Connection, in whatever Scheme "is propoſed by his Majeſty's Servants," ſuffer ‡ *the Speaker without the leaſt Debate or Oppoſition to take the Chair, only to vote Millions, and levy Thouſands*; we have the Comfort however to ſee that theſe Millions are voted, and theſe Thouſands levied, not for the ſupport of a Cabal,

* P. 2. of the Letter. ‡ Vid. the Letter. Pag. 2.

or the nurſing of a Faction, but for aſſerting the Honour and the Intereſt of our Country.

Have a little Patience, Sir, we ſhall ſoon, hope, have reduced our Enemies, to reaſon and then we ſhall perhaps again have leiſure to quarrel among ourſelves; we may again ſee more than one Champion in the Field; we may then liſt under that Banner, to which our Intereſt or our Paſſions may direct us.

In the mean time, let us thank Providence for the preſent happy Situation of our Affairs. EveryMan ſhould, as far as he can, endeavour to encourage that conciliatory Diſpoſition, to cheriſh that Concord and Union, which is at preſent ſo advantageous to our Country; and every Head of a Party muſt for this have a ſhare in our Acknowledgments for his Acquieſcence.

But you have drawn the public Attention upon the two great Perſons whom you addreſs. The noble Lord has great Merit both with his Country and his Prince. His early Zeal cannot be forgotten. His extenſive Influence, his perſonal Authority, exerted as they have been, and as I believe they always will

be, for the Good of his Country, will always challenge the good Opinion of his Countrymen. Nor will our Country forget to do juſtice to the active Spirit of that great Man, to whoſe unwearied Efforts *Great Britain* is ſo much indebted for her preſent Glory; to whom you and I, Sir, owe it, that in a War with ſuch a Power as *France* we now debate whether our Country ſhould uſe Moderation. I mean not, Sir, to make any Compariſon, for it is not now a Time to draw the nice Line between the Merits of great Men, or to aſcertain exactly where the Merit of the one ends, and the other begins. Compariſons are always invidious; they might at this Time be hurtful, and tend to weaken the Bonds that unite ſo many Intereſts apparently diſcordant in the Service of their Country.

It was no Spirit of Contradiction, Sir, that made me take the pains of anſwering your Letter; therefore as I canvaſs with Freedom thoſe Points which appear to me to be miſtaken, ſo with great Pleaſure I join Hands where I think what you ſay is juſt and reaſonable. I agree with you intirely in your Judgment of a Place Bill, which would, I believe, be more effectual, if not made too violent in its

firſt Operation like an * *Oliverian* ſelf-denying Ordinance. Your Judgment on Mediators is ſurely juſt and ſenſible; and we may believe the Miniſtry think ſo, who have not employed any Mediation, though they have offered to treat with our Enemies.

I muſt now aſk yours and the public Indulgence for any Miſtakes. I have not willingly perverted or miſrepreſented any thing. I do not pretend to the Credit of a Writer, but I have endeavoured to underſtand the Queſtion I write upon, as I think every Man is bound to do who troubles the Public with his Opinions. If I am miſtaken in what I advance, it does not much ſignify who the Author of wrong Notions may be. If my Opinions are well grounded, and my Remarks juſt, my Country may receive ſome Benefit from them; and if ſhe receives a Benefit, it is of little Concern by what Hand it is adminiſtered.

I am, SIR,

Yours, &c. &c.

* Pag. 48. of the Letter.

FINIS.

POSTSCRIPT.

I Am obliged to the Publick for the candid and favourable reception they have given to the foregoing Remarks. I was ſenſible that I oppoſed myſelf in ſome Points, to the prevailing Paſſions and prejudices of the People. I did not attempt in point of Eloquence and Spirit to vie with the Performance I undertook to examine. If therefore I have removed any Impreſſions raiſed by that Letter, which every where tended to confirm thoſe Prejudices, and to inflame thoſe Paſſions, I can only attribute it to the irreſiſtible Force of Truth, and to the Equity and Moderation of the Sentiments I endeavoured to inſpire. In theſe alone I can pretend to come into any Competition with the Author of the Letter to the Two Great Men.

Since the printing off this Edition I have been informed that a Gentleman, to whoſe Opinion I pay great Deference, does not think I have allowed ſufficient Weight to the Lumber Trade of *Canada*; and again, that in conſidering our Decay in the foreign Trade of Sugars, ſince the Peace of *Utrecht*, I have, he thinks, not enough attended to the vaſt Increaſe of the Home Conſumption, which he ſuppoſes

to be the true Cauſe of the Decay of the foreign Trade.

I am much obliged to the Gentleman for the Obſervations; they are indeed Circumſtances, upon which I ought to have been more explicit. That the Increaſe of the Home Conſumption is one Cauſe why we have loſt the Foreign Market, I readily admit. I have not any where ſaid, that our Sugar Produce ſince the Period I mentioned, is at all diminiſhed; on the contrary, I have reaſon to know it is conſiderably increaſed; but then it has only increaſed in proportion to our own Wants, and not at all in proportion to the Foreign Demand. The Foreign Trade we have clearly loſt. Nay to ſpeak plain, we do not entirely ſupply our own Markets; a great Part, if not far the greateſt Part of the Sugar conſumed in *Ireland*, comes from *Portugal*. But *France*, from the Period I mentioned, has increaſed her Produce not only in proportion to her Home Conſumption, which as well as ours is much enlarged, but in proportion alſo to the Foreign Demand, which has increaſed in the ſame manner all over *Europe*. From being unable to furniſh her own, ſhe has ſupplied all the Markets which were formerly in our hands.

I ob-

I obſerved this Fact, I lamented it, and I propoſed a Plan in ſome meaſure to remove it, a Plan which might make us ſhare at leaſt ſome Part of the Market with *France*. The Addition of a new Sugar Iſland, I do not ſay probably will, but actually muſt let us into this Market in proportion to its Produce. We can know if we pleaſe to the utmoſt Exactneſs, what the Sugar Produce of *Guadaloupe* was before the War, and then we may know with equal Exactneſs what we ſhall have to export if we keep this Iſland, and what Advantages *Great Britain* muſt certainly reap by that Acquiſition. All this depends on Facts; any thing elſe is uncertain, and in Speculation at beſt. We do not know, that by any Scheme for the further Culture of our own Iſlands, we can produce more than Sugar enough for our Home Conſumption: Nay, we know almoſt beyond a doubt, that they never will produce much more, becauſe our *Caribbee* Iſlands are cultivated to the utmoſt Extent; and as for *Jamaica*, that Iſland has not near ſo much Land fit for Sugar, and convenient for Exportation, as is generally imagined; and if it had, yet it is the Intereſt of all the Planters there, to keep things on their

preſent Footing; for they avoid harraſſing, and wearing out their Land, they bring it gradually into Culture, they keep up the Price, and they gain a very large Profit on their Stock. That they reaſon in this manner is evident, becauſe the Produce of *Jamaica* has been many years nearly at the ſame Point. I believe we ſhall find it very difficult to make any Change in this Particular; and I own I do not expect great Matters from any Scheme which depends for its Succeſs, on making many People relinquiſh what they imagine to be their Intereſt.

As to Lumber, whoever conſiders the Extent of our Colonies in *America*, their Situation, and the extreme Woodineſs of the Soil in moſt of them, will eaſily ſee that they can more than ſupply all the *Weſt Indies* with that Article, and will probably be able ſo to do for Centuries to come. Tho' it was the Intereſt of *France* by every means to encourage the Trade of Lumber from *Canada*, yet *Canada*, favoured as it was, never was able to ſupply the *French* Iſlands, which are almoſt wholly furniſhed with Lumber from our Colonies: and if with all the Encouragement of the Mother Country,

Country, *Canada* was not able to ſupply the *French* Iſlands, I ſhould imagine ſhe could have leſs chance of ſucceeding in that Trade, if in our Poſſeſſion, as ſhe could not then hope for any particular Indulgences. The Lumber is a very groſs Article, and attended with very ſmall Profits; and it is abſolutely neceſſary the Freight ſhould be extremely light, which from ſuch a Diſtance as the habitable part of *Canada* is from the *Weſt Indies*, it could not poſſibly be; and this is perhaps the reaſon why we in *England* have never been able to ſupply ourſelves with Deals and Naval Stores in any Quantity from our Colonies.

Upon all theſe Conſiderations taken together, my Opinion for keeping of *Guadaloupe* in preference to *Canada* was founded; for having ſecured thoſe Bounds which were the primary Object of the War, I imagined that there was a Point in which, whilſt we ſecured an Indemnification from our Conqueſt, the *French* and we might have Advantages in ſome meaſure reciprocal, and that thus we might make a Peace agreeable at once to Equity and to our Intereſt. For the *French* abound, and we are deficient in the *Weſt Indies*; the caſe is reverſed in *North Ame-*

America; and the Propoſal of retaining *Guadaloupe* and leaving to them a part of *Canada*, is perhaps the only Point in which, I ſuppoſed, and I hope proved, that the *French* can give us what they want leſs than we do, and receive in return what is far leſs advantageous to us than it will be to them. I muſt own it appeared to me to be the happieſt Ground in the World for a Peace, the way to which I thought, and ſtill think, ought to be as little perplexed with Difficulties as poſſible. I thought this more expedient, equitable, and practicable, than the Plan propoſed in the Letter.

I have thus attempted to anſwer theſe two Objections. For when Men of Knowledge and Candour do me the honour to obſerve upon any part of my Argument, I ſhall always think myſelf bound to examine their Objections with the utmoſt Attention; if they appear to me well grounded, I ſhall think it no Shame to retract my Opinions publickly; if they do not convince me, I ſhall think my time cannot be better employed than in endeavouring to remove them. But it would be a very improvident waſte of my own and my Readers leiſure, to take the trouble of anſwering Objections of another Stile

and Character; ſuch are thoſe inſerted in the Gentleman's Magazine, which ariſe from a total Ignorance of the Subject, and from an entire Miſunderſtanding or Perverſion of my Notions, from the Beginning to the End of the Paper.

When I ventured to trouble the Publick with my Obſervations, I was perſuaded that in deliberating a Plan for Pacification, nothing could be at once more uſeleſs and illiberal than thoſe Arguments for exorbitant Terms, which are drawn from Conſiderations of the Enemy's Perfidy. For they tend to increaſe that national Partiality, which is ever the greateſt Obſtruction to a fair Agreement, and ſerve to no other Purpoſe, than that bad one, of leading our Attention from our Intereſts to our Reſentments; and however they make a Performance popular for a Day, they will inevitably diſguſt all People of Judgement, who know that ſuch Topicks never can be admitted in the Management of publick Buſineſs, and that they are wholly remote from the Stile which civilized Nations uſe towards each other when they come to negotiate. There are indeed many warm, and perhaps well-meaning People, but certainly very much deceived, who imagine, that a Man's

Man's Zeal for his Country is to be eſtimated by the Paſſion with which he expreſſes himſelf againſt the Enemy. They conſider an inflamed Declamation as the Language of Patriotiſm; and having heated their Imaginations with horrid Pictures of their Enemies, they come at laſt to think it no Injuſtice in themſelves to do thoſe very things, for which, they ſo abhor and abominate others. But for my part, as I never thought it right or prudent arrogantly to demand what we may be obliged ſhamefully to renounce, I have always thought that Moderation, Moderation at leaſt in Language, was what became every Condition of Fortune; and that without it, Proſperity in particular, is never reſpectable, and not always ſafe: and I rejoice from my heart that we are now in ſuch a State, that I may with Propriety apply to my Countrymen theſe beautiful Lines, which if they were not written, were at leaſt reviſed and approved by one of the greateſt Captains of Antiquity, and one who contributed the moſt to the Embelliſhment as well as the Grandeur of his Country.

Quam eſtis maxume
Potentes, Dites, Fortunati, Nobiles,
Tam maxume vos æquo *animo* æqua *noſcere*
Oportet; ſi vos voltis perhiberi probos.

FINIS.